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Scholars  have  recently  highlighted  the  promise  of open  innovation.  In this  paper,  we  treat  open
innovation—in  it’s  different  forms  and  manifestations—as  well  as  internal  or closed  innovation,  as  unique
governance  forms  with  different  beneﬁts  and  costs.  We  discuss  how  each  governance  form,  whether  open
or closed,  is composed  of  a set  of  instruments  that  access  (a)  different  types  of communication  channels
for  knowledge  sharing,  (b)  different  types  of  incentives,  and  (c)  different  types  of  property  rights  for
appropriating  value  from  innovation.  We  focus  on  the  innovation  “problem”  as  the  central  unit  of  analy-eywords:
pen and closed innovation
overnance choice
trategy
roblem solving
sis,  arguing  for a match  between  problem  types  and governance  forms,  which  vary  from  open  to  closed
and  which  support  alternative  forms  of  solution  search.  In all,  the  goal  of  this  paper  is to provide  a  com-
parative  framework  for managing  innovation,  where  we  delineate  and  discuss  four  categories  of open
innovation  governance  forms  (markets,  partnerships,  contests  and  tournaments  and  user  or community
innovation)  and  compare  them  with  each  other  and  with  two  internal  or closed  forms  of innovation
governance  (authority  and  consensus-based  hierarchy).
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. All rights  reserved.. Introduction
Open innovation has received increased attention over the past
ecade (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; von Hippel, 2005; von Hippel
nd von Krogh, 2003; von Krogh et al., 2003; Laursen and Salter,
006; for an overview see Dahlander and Gann, 2010; Van de
rande et al., 2010; West and Bogers, 2011). Open innovation
cholars have focused on the need for focal organizations to tran-
cend their boundaries by sourcing knowledge and technology
xternally. This research argues that environmental uncertainty
nd the complexities of innovation and knowledge recombination
ave led to the increased permeability of organizational boundaries
nd the need for organizations to interact with their environ-
ent and external stakeholders in more open ways. The notion of
pen innovation has encompassed a wide range of external actors,
 This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1865 288912.
E-mail addresses: teppo.felin@sbs.ox.ac.uk (T. Felin),
enger@wustl.edu (T.R. Zenger).
1 Tel.: +1 314 935 6399.
048-7333/$ – see front matter © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.09.006including users, customers, suppliers, universities, and competi-
tors. The underlying mechanisms for accessing external knowledge
and fostering open innovation have, in turn, encompassed a range
of alternatives including contests and tournaments, alliances and
joint ventures, corporate venture capital, licensing, open source
platforms, and participation in various development communi-
ties.
Scholars have recently started to look at the governance impli-
cations of open innovation. In general, the ﬁndings suggest that
increased linkages to and knowledge ﬂows from various external
partners, particularly in uncertain environments, lead to improved
innovation outcomes (West and Bogers, 2011). For example, Fey
and Birkinshaw (2005) (cf. Dahlander and Gann, 2010) argue and
ﬁnd that a ﬁrm’s R&D and innovation performance increases as
more relational governance modes are utilized, such as linkages to
alliance partners and universities. In line with this argument, Keil
et al. (2008) also ﬁnd that the increased use of various, more open
governance forms—e.g., alliances, CVC investments, JVs—leads to
increased innovation outcomes for ﬁrms. The central intuition,
whether we are talking about formal governance arrangements,
or informal search (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Laursen and Salter,
2006; Tether and Tajar, 2008), is that an increase in the num-
ber of external linkages and breadth of search can have beneﬁcial
outcomes for organizations striving to innovate. Along these lines,
Leiponen and Helfat (2010) also ﬁnd that an increased number
reserved.
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seeks to effectively govern, manage and organize problem solving
associated with innovation.8
5 We might note that we treat the respective governance forms as relatively dis-
crete  choices (as idealized pure types), in line with existing work in transaction cost
economics (Williamson, 1991). But we certainly recognize that these forms are not
completely discrete, but rather, continuous. But for purposes of theorizing we feel
that an idealized approach will surface key considerations (cf. Weber, 1949), bothT. Felin, T.R. Zenger / Rese
f external knowledge sources leads to increased innovation and
etter ﬁnancial performance. Love et al. (2013) (cf. Powell et al.,
996) point to similar ﬁndings by highlighting how the “breadth
f external innovation linkages” can lead to improved innovation
utcomes. Beyond this focus on the breadth or number of external
ies, yet other studies have highlighted the beneﬁts of interacting
ith speciﬁc external constituents, such as users and communities
Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 2006; also see Chatterji and Fabrizio,
013; Foss et al., 2011a,b) or universities (Bercovitz and Feldman,
007).
While the case for increasing access to external knowledge
nd greater openness in innovation is compelling, the compara-
ive and managerial governance implications of this argument are
ot quite as clear. The aforementioned work focuses on ﬁrm-level
ggregates—for example, on how certain types or aggregate quanti-
ies of external linkages or governance modes can lead to increased
nnovation (Fey and Birkinshaw, 2005). But any advice or pre-
criptions based on ﬁrm-level aggregates (that is, for the ﬁrm as
 whole to increasingly use more open governance modes) can
ead to mis-speciﬁed governance solutions at the micro level.2
fter all, ﬁrms continue to exist and organizational boundaries
ppear to remain highly relevant for organizing innovation activi-
ies (cf. Williamson, 1991).3 Thus a more ﬁne-grained, nuanced and
ormative approach is needed, focused on the micro-level, compar-
tive choices that managers face when innovating, with particular
ttention to when more open versus more closed forms—and vice
ersa—might be more beneﬁcial. Thus our focus is on the respective
eneﬁts and costs of disparate open and closed forms of gover-
ance. In short, when should ﬁrms use speciﬁc open forms of
overnance versus when should they use alternative, more closed
orms?4
Scholars have indeed begun to address these, more compara-
ive, governance-oriented questions in the context of innovation
e.g., Afuah and Tucci, 2012; Lakhani et al., 2012; Van de Vrande
t al., 2009; also see Baldwin and von Hippel, 2012). For exam-
le, Afuah and Tucci (2012) recently compare two governance
orms, crowdsourcing versus internal sourcing, and highlight how
he “probability of crowdsourcing” increases depending on the
ature of the problem (cf. Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Van de
rande et al. in turn look at how “ﬁrms tackle different types
f uncertainty with different governance forms” (2009: 62). And,
eugelers and Cassiman (1999) (cf. Geyskens et al., 2006) study
he make or buy decision in the context of innovation and place
mphasis on the role of ﬁrm size and industry characteristics in
etermining governance choice. We  seek to contribute to this
merging body of research on the comparative aspects of governing
nnovation.
Our speciﬁc focus is examining how attributes of the inno-
ation “problem” (cf. Nickerson and Zenger, 2004) deﬁne the
hoices of governance. We  seek to articulate the microanalytic
eneﬁts and costs of disparate forms for governing innova-
ion and their respective limits in application (cf. Zenger et al.,
011). Importantly, our contribution is in comparatively examin-
ng the unique problem solving attributes of distinct governance
2 Some have also voiced concerns that increasingly engaging external con-
tituents and outsourcing might “hollow out” the ﬁrm (Foss, 2003).
3 Some have argued that the knowledge economy, and the associated need for
xternal linkages, will essentially make ﬁrm boundaries superﬂuous (e.g., Benkler,
002; Hadﬁeld, 2011).
4 Firm boundaries, after all, still exist, even though some have argued that the
nowledge economy and the associated need for external linkages will make them
uperﬂuous (Benkler, 2002; Hadﬁeld, 2011).olicy 43 (2014) 914–925 915
forms associated with innovation. We  examine the composition
of forms by evaluating their access to (a) different commu-
nication channels for knowledge sharing, (b) different types
of incentives, and (c) different types of property rights.5 We
ﬁrst discuss the importance of problems as the central unit of
analysis. We  then delineate two  closed (hierarchy and consen-
sus) and four open (markets/contracts, partnerships/alliances/CVC,
contests/tournaments/platforms, users/communities) forms of
governance and discuss how each, respectively, implicates commu-
nication channels for knowledge sharing, incentives and property
rights. Our goal, in all, is to provide theoretical reasoning for when
and why certain forms of governance work best, speciﬁcally in the
context of problem solving and innovation. Our approach is nor-
mative and prescriptive, adopting the perspective of the manager
of a focal ﬁrm tasked with organizing to optimize innovative output.
Naturally, managing innovation is likely to be a complex amalgam-
ation of open and closed governance forms, where organizational
boundaries are more permeable in some situations—depending
on the nature of the innovation problem—and less so in
others. But focusing on problems as a unit of analysis pro-
vides an unapologetically pragmatic and managerially oriented
approach for studying the microanalytics of innovation governance
and choice.
2. Innovation, problem solving, and governance choices
Innovation is a multi-faceted, multi-level concept and scholars
have focused on varied aspects of innovation (for an overview of
the innovation literature, see Crossan and Apaydin, 2009).6 With-
out getting mired in the vast literature and varied deﬁnitions of
innovation, we  simply focus on innovation as the process by which
existing knowledge and inputs are creatively and efﬁciently recom-
bined to create new and valuable outputs. More speciﬁcally, our
interest is in how this recombinative process of innovation is efﬁ-
ciently organized or governed. Our effort therefore encompasses
inputs, processes, and outputs across varying levels of analysis, but
with the aim of examining how ﬁrms efﬁciently manage and govern
the process of assembling and organizing inputs to generate valu-
able outputs.7 The central actor in our theory is the manager, whofor  scholars and managers.
6 Crossan and Apaydin, based on their extensive literature review, provide the
following, broad deﬁnition of innovation—“innovation is: production or adoption,
assimilation, and exploitation of a value-added novelty in economic and social
spheres; renewal and enlargement of products, services and markets; developments
of  new methods of production; and establishment of new management systems. It
is  both a process and an outcome” (2009: 1155).
7 In line with our broad deﬁnition, as argued by others (e.g., West and Bogers,
2011: 4), the open innovation literature also adopts “an expansive deﬁnition of inno-
vation,” focused broadly on “new”-ness: new products, technologies, processes and
so  forth.
8 Extant work on open innovation focuses not just on the inﬂows of knowledge,
but  also outﬂows. We  thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. We
focus largely on the inﬂows of knowledge. There is indeed relatively little work
on  outﬂows, for example, outﬂows are only mentioned once in each of two recent
reviews of the open innovation literature (e.g., Dahlander and Gann, 2010; West and
Bogers, 2011). These outﬂows, however, have recently been discussed in the form of
externalities to openness, where more open ﬁrms essentially seem to beneﬁt from
positive externalities (Roper et al., 2013).
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Table  1
Optimal solution search methods by alternative problem types.
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High Low
ry-gu
d, the
2
g
a
a
a
i
a
S
d
S
a
p
a
t
m
T
l
2
k
W
t
s
t
t
n
d
T
t
i
p
e
i
l
W
(
e
p
m
s
2
l
o
C
e
r
l
o
ﬁ
oHidden knowledge High Open, theo
Low  Centralize
.1. Dimensionalizing problems and search
We  focus on the problem as our central unit of analysis in
uiding the governance of innovation.9 The problem provides
 managerially relevant, practical and more micro-level unit of
nalysis around which governance choices are selected, with the
ggregation of these choices deﬁning the degree to which a ﬁrm
s open or closed. The problem solving perspective (Nickerson
nd Zenger, 2004; Leiblein and Macher, 2009) builds on Herbert
imon’s intuition in viewing problems as complex systems that
iffer in structure and complexity (Simon, 1973; Fernandes and
imon, 1999). Differing problems, in essence, demand differing
pproaches to solution search. Our effort is therefore to match
roblem types with governance forms that differentially support
lternative forms of solution search when innovating. To enable
his matching, we begin by identifying key attributes of problems
ost relevant in selecting governance forms (for an overview, see
able 1). We examine two key dimensions of problems: prob-
em complexity, consistent with prior work (Leiblein and Macher,
009), and the hiddenness of dispersed knowledge, speciﬁcally
nowledge deemed relevant to the innovation problem at hand.
e also explore two dimensions of search: the source of direction
hat guides search and the mechanism that solicits participation in
earch. The form of search direction is either simple, decentralized
rial and error, or theory driven search. Participation in search is
hus either centrally identiﬁed and centrally selected or self nomi-
ated and self selected.
In the two sections that follow, we match the above problem
imensions to optimal search attributes, as summarized in Table 1.
hereafter we examine the capacity of governance forms to support
hese two dimensions of search. While our central unit of analysis
s the problem, we should note that our goal is not to explain the
rocess of problem formulation (see Baer et al., 2012; Nickerson
t al., 2007)—an important topic, but not our focus. Rather, our aim
s to highlight how particular problems, once identiﬁed and formu-
ated, are efﬁciently solved through optimal governance choices.
hile our arguments are informed by Nickerson and Zenger’s
2004) focus on “problems” as the central unit of analysis in gov-
rnance, we extend this analysis by examining an expanded set of
roblem attributes, matching these problem attributes to search
echanisms and governance forms with their unique bundles of
upporting instruments.
.2. Problem complexity and structure
Innovation problems differ in their complexity. Complex prob-
ems are like complex systems that are “made up of a large number
f parts that interact in a nonsimple way” (Simon, 1962: 468).
omplex problems involve a vast array of highly interdependent
lements, choices, and knowledge sets that must be creatively
ecombined to compose valuable solutions. With complex prob-
ems, the value of solutions will shift dramatically based on small
9 All innovation admittedly does not begin with a clear problem, though deliberate
r non-serendipitous forms of innovation do. It might also be that solutions in fact
nd  problems, as discussed by Cohen et al. (1972) in their garbage can model of
rganizational choice.ided search Open, directional, trial and error search
ory guided search Centralized, directional, trial and error search
shifts in choices. Solving complex problems therefore requires
the ﬁrm to compose some understanding—or a theory (Felin and
Zenger, 2009)—of the patterns of interaction among choices and
relevant knowledge. Simple problems, by contrast, are problems
where the value of solutions is not strongly shaped by interac-
tions among the choices and relevant knowledge sets (Leiblein
and Macher, 2009; Macher, 2006). This allows for rather indepen-
dent design choices by those possessing more distinct and separate
knowledge to generate high value solutions. Similar intuition con-
cerning problem complexity is reﬂected in NK models (Kauffman,
1993), which deﬁne the search for increased performance as nav-
igating a rugged landscape where the terrain is deﬁned by the
number of solution design choices (N), and the degree of interaction
among them (K) (Levinthal, 1993). Complex problems possess high
levels of K. Such problems are consequently less decomposable,
meaning that control over particular choices is difﬁcult to dele-
gate to any given entity or individual, as all choices depend on the
conﬁguration of all other choices.
Complex problems also differ in how well these interdepen-
dencies are understood. Complex problems that are ill-structured
not only possess substantial interdependencies among relevant
knowledge and solution design choices, but the nature of these
interdependencies is not well articulated (Fernandes and Simon,
1999; Macher, 2006; Leiblein and Macher, 2009). Such uncer-
tainty about the nature of interdependencies exacerbates efforts
to decentralize design choices or thereby decompose the solu-
tion search process. By contrast, solution search for simple
problems can be extensively decentralized or decomposed, allow-
ing autonomous actors with their own  separate knowledge to
independently evaluate their choices or experiments. We  can
therefore rank order problems in terms of their complexity begin-
ning with simple, decomposable problems, moving to moderate,
nearly decomposable problems, and ending with complex, non-
decomposable problems. Moreover, complex problems demand a
different approach to governing search than simple problems (see
Table 1).
Solving simple problems requires directional search—simple
trial and error, or search guided by simple feedback (March and
Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). New solutions are dis-
covered as independent actors, either inside or outside the ﬁrm,
sequentially alter one solution design choice at a time (Gavetti
and Levinthal, 2000), observe whether the solution value improves
or declines in response (Cyert and March, 1963) and then update
accordingly. If the solution value increases, then search continues
down this same path until improvement ceases, at which point a
different element is adjusted (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). One
beneﬁt of directional search is that a broad set of actors can receive
independent invitations to participate in problem solving, as par-
ticipation in the process of innovating for the focal ﬁrm requires no
form of coordination among independent problem solvers. Gover-
nance forms that simply support decentralized, autonomous search
are here sufﬁcient.
Directional search, however, is not well suited to solving more
complex, ill-structured problems. Considerable interdependence
among relevant knowledge and solution design choices, especially
when these interdependencies are poorly understood, render feed-
back on simple design adjustments of limited value to problem
solvers. Instead, a more holistic approach to solution design is
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equired (Macher, 2006). Here efﬁcient search mandates that the
rm ﬁrst assemble relevant knowledge, then recombine it, and then
ompose a theory (cf. Felin and Zenger, 2009)—a simpliﬁed rep-
esentation of a problem’s underlying performance landscape.10
his theory is then used to pursue solution search by enabling
xperiments that evaluate the likely outcome of alternative choice
ombinations. Thus, unlike directional search, which invites any
nd all to participate who possess knowledge they deem as
elevant, theory-based search requires ﬁrst identifying and syn-
hesizing the relevant knowledge that the ﬁrm seeks to explore. Of
ecessity therefore, governance forms that support theory-driven
earch are more centralized or facilitate more extensive knowledge
haring. We  thus conclude:
roposition 1. As problems become more complex, the ﬁrm adopts
overnance that facilitates the extensive knowledge sharing required
o form theories and heuristics to guide solution search. By contrast, as
roblems become simpler, the ﬁrm adopts governance that motivates
ore autonomous trial and error search based on local knowledge.
.3. Hidden knowledge
The hiddenness of knowledge is particularly relevant in the con-
ext of innovation. Problems thus also differ in the degree to which
he sources or location of knowledge deemed relevant are known
o the manager, or “available with practical amounts of search”
Fernandes and Simon, 1999: 226). Simon (1973) actually identi-
es this awareness of relevant knowledge as a necessary feature
f well-structured problems. However, we believe this dimension
erits separate and independent consideration, as it has substan-
ial bearing on innovation and the approach to governing solution
earch. Prior work has focused on the dispersion and scope of
nowledge relevant to solving a problem as a critical problem
imension that drives governance (Lakhani et al., 2012; Afuah and
ucci, 2012; also see Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010). Thus, Bill Joy, the
un Microsystems founder’s famous quip that “most of the smartest
eople work for someone else” recognizes the distributed nature
f knowledge relevant to solving many problems.
However, the problem is not merely the dispersion of rele-
ant knowledge, as prior work suggests. If the manager knows the
ocation of the requisite dispersed knowledge (and can access or
cquire it), dispersion need not be an impediment. The real difﬁ-
ulty arises when the manager is unaware of the location of the
elevant knowledge for solving particular innovation problems.
nder these circumstances, the manager cannot acquire knowl-
dge, or contract for it, but must instead invite and motivate those
ossessing it to reveal themselves.11 Individuals or organizations
ith relevant knowledge may  be unknown to the ﬁrm, and thus
echanisms for self-selection or self-identiﬁcation are critical.
The manager faces a fundamental choice concerning how to gov-
rn this process of assembling the knowledge relevant for problem
earch. The manager can choose to centrally identify knowledge rel-
vant to a problem and then acquire or hire it. Or, alternatively, the
anager can choose to broadcast a problem and induce a process
f self-selection by inviting those with relevant knowledge to self-
dentify and provide proposals for solving the innovation problem
10 The notion of “theoretical search” is further discussed in Felin and Zenger (2009).
he basic idea is that entrepreneurs, managers and ﬁrms—particularly when pursu-
ng  novelty and innovation— necessarily engage in a process of theorizing akin to
ow scientists compose theories to understand their relevant world.
11 Our focus with the hiddenness of knowledge is speciﬁcally about cases where the
anager does not know where the relevant knowledge resides: who has it and/or
here it is located. We  recognize, as noted by an anonymous reviewer, that man-
gers may  know where knowledge resides but it may  nonetheless remain hidden if
he  relevant parties don’t want to reveal it, thus for example implicating incentives
as  we discuss later).olicy 43 (2014) 914–925 917
at hand. The match to problem types here is rather straightforward.
When the location of relevant knowledge is unknown to the man-
ager, the manager’s task is to craft governance that prompts self
selection, for instance, widely broadcasting the problem in hopes
that those with valuable information or valuable solutions will
reveal themselves (cf. Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010). By contrast,
when the location of relevant knowledge is known, then the gover-
nance exercise is more straightforward and centrally directed. For
instance, simple invitations, typically with compensation, to dis-
close knowledge, perhaps in the form of employment contracts or
licensing agreements, may  be sufﬁcient. We thus conclude:
Proposition 2. As problems require hidden knowledge to solve, the
ﬁrm adopts governance forms that widely broadcast problems, and rel-
evant knowledge is then self-revealed rather than centrally identiﬁed
by the focal ﬁrm.
3. Matching problem types to governance forms
To this point we  have argued that problems differ along two
key dimensions, complexity and the hiddenness of knowledge, and
have argued that these dimensions demand alternative approaches
to solution search. Complex problems demand governance forms
that support the composition of a theory to guide search to then
run “experiments” consistent with that theory. Composing theory
necessitates an organizational environment that supports broad
knowledge exchange and creative knowledge recombination. By
contrast, simple, decomposable problems require little knowl-
edge sharing, but instead incentives for decentralized, trial and
error search. Indeed, governance structures that support extensive
knowledge sharing are unnecessarily costly in this context. Again,
when the knowledge relevant to solving a problem is both broadly
distributed and its location unknown, then governance must induce
the revelation of this knowledge. And, when the relevant sources
of knowledge are known, governance can centrally identify knowl-
edge.
Governance forms differ in their capacity to support the broad
knowledge exchange central to theory building. They also differ
in their capacity to induce the self-revelation of otherwise hid-
den knowledge. Hence, the governance exercise involves matching
problem types, which differ in their need for knowledge exchange
and in their need for knowledge discovery, to governance forms,
which in turn differ in their capacity to support these two  key
governance attributes.
We examine here six distinct governance forms, or categories of
forms. Two are internal to the ﬁrm: authority-based hierarchy and
consensus-based hierarchy. Four are external, more “open” forms:
partnerships/alliances, markets/contracts, contests/platforms and
user/community innovation (for an overview, see Table 2). Each
of these forms or categories of form represents novel and distinct
means of governance. However, our aim is not to be exhaustive in
describing the full set of governance options available to managers.
For example, we say little about internal hybrids (cf. Zenger and
Hesterly, 1997). Moreover, we bundle some forms into categories,
such as alliances, partnerships, and corporate venture capital (CVC),
that share a similar conﬁguration of the governance attributes upon
which we focus, though we recognize important distinctions exist
among the forms within categories (e.g., Dushnitsky and Lavie,
2010: 25). We then compare categories of forms based on the access
that each provides to three distinct mechanisms or instruments:
(a) communication channels for transferring knowledge, (b) incen-
tives for motivating search, and (c) property rights over solutions
and knowledge. We  then match these governance forms, comprised
of bundles of governance instruments, with attributes of solution
search and with the problems that vary in complexity and the level
of hidden knowledge relevant to solving them (see Fig. 1).
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Table  2
Comparative analysis of governance forms.
Firm/closed Open innovation
Authority-based
hierarchy
Consensus-based
hierarchy
Markets/Contracts Partnerships/
alliances/CVC
Contests/tournaments/
platforms
Users/communities
Communication
channels
Vertical, socially
embedded within
ﬁrm
Horizontal, socially
embedded within
ﬁrm
Limited, selective
invitations
Bilateral, socially
embedded
Horizontal,
broadcast, IT
supported
Horizontal, socially
embedded outside
the ﬁrm
Incentives Low-powered Low-powered High-powered Cooperative, Moderate powered Low-powered
lly ow
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gProperty rights Possessed by focal
ﬁrm
Possessed by focal
ﬁrm
Externa
and exch
.1. Hierarchical governance: authority-based and
onsensus-based
The features of hierarchy as a governance form for problem
olving have been compared with market forms and discussed
xtensively elsewhere (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Leiblein and
acher, 2009). This prior discussion highlights two  distinct forms
f internal governance, authority-based hierarchy and consensus-
ased hierarchy, each possessing distinct governance attributes.
ecause our particular focus here is on open (or non-hierarchical)
orms for governing innovation, we review the distinctive gover-
ance attributes of hierarchy only rather brieﬂy, so as to permit a
ore extensive comparison with open governance forms. Stated
imply, while both authority- and consensus-based hierarchy are
imilar in their approach to knowledge identiﬁcation, they dif-
er in their approach to solution search. As we elaborate below,
hese similarities and differences reﬂect the bundles of supporting
nstruments each possesses. While the two forms of hierarchical
overnance largely share a common approach to the use of incen-
ives and property rights as governance instruments, they differ
igniﬁcantly in their approach to communication channels and
ssociated knowledge sharing.
Within ﬁrms, property rights over solutions or knowledge
enerally are not assigned to individual employees, or even
roups of employees, but rather to the ﬁrm itself. In agreeing to
Fig. 1. Solution search/prhigh-powered
ned
d
Negotiated Varied (dispersed
or focal ﬁrm)
None
employment, employees essentially assign to the ﬁrm all rights to
their innovative outputs, ceding property rights in exchange for
a guaranteed salary (Coase, 1937). The very notion of hierarchical
ﬁat recognizes employers’ rights to “direct the factors of produc-
tion” (Coase, 1937: 391). In fact, many employment contracts
today, particularly for employees hired to generate knowledge
and invent, stipulate that intellectual property generated from
their work is assigned to the ﬁrm, though, historically this has
not always been the case (see Fisk, 1998). Productive work within
the ﬁrm is jointly produced and highly co-specialized among
employees. Consequently, the assignment of property rights to
ﬁrms avoids the rather arbitrary and costly task of trying to impute
the speciﬁc contributions of disparate actors within the ﬁrm who
participate in joint problem solving. This approach to property
rights also allows the ﬁrm to promote the ﬂexible recombination
of knowledge within the ﬁrm without having to incur complex
contracting costs to promote knowledge sharing.
Consistent with this approach to property rights, the incentives
for solving problems within hierarchies are low-powered, rela-
tive to the incentives accessible through market exchange. While
strong incentives such as piecework pay may  exist within some
hierarchies, these high-powered incentives are seldom used to
compensate knowledge workers. Rather than reward individuals
for each exchange of knowledge or for their contributions to knowl-
edge generated, ﬁrms instead pay salaries in exchange for owning
oblem complexity.
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oth the present and future knowledge generated. This approach
lso discourages individuals from strategically hoarding knowledge
r seeking to strategically shape the theories that emerge in ways
hat are personally advantageous (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004).
nstead, these incentives promote efﬁcient teamwork, interaction
nd knowledge exchange. The incentive-related costs of hierarchy
re nonetheless signiﬁcant (cf. Williamson, 1991; Zenger, 1992;
olmstrom, 1999), as the absence of direct incentives for effort
an encourage greater free riding or social loaﬁng, and thus dimin-
shed effort. The inability to provide high-powered incentives is in
art due to the imprecision of measurement. Within the ﬁrm social
omparison is also particularly pervasive and efforts to differen-
ially reward in any aggressive way are likely to trigger costly social
omparison activity (lobbying for pay, reducing effort, sabotaging
thers’ efforts) (Nickerson and Zenger, 2008; Zenger, 1992).
Low-powered incentives and property rights to knowledge
wned by the ﬁrm promote communication channels that differ
igniﬁcantly from those provided in the market, including most
pen forms of innovation governance. While, as we discuss later,
any forms of open innovation rather poorly support the form of
xplorative knowledge recombination required to solve complex
roblems, hierarchies offer rich forms of communication.
Following prior work (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004), and as
oted previously, we distinguish between two  hierarchical forms:
uthority based hierarchy and consensus-based hierarchy. Each
ields a distinct approach to supporting communication and each
s advantageous with differing problem types. The distinctive fea-
ure of hierarchy is its capacity to more effectively facilitate the
ow of knowledge. Within the boundaries of the ﬁrm, the manager
omposes an environment where communication costs—the costs
f knowledge transfer—are considerably lower. A common identity
nd language facilitate extensive and efﬁcient knowledge sharing
cf. Kogut and Zander, 1996).12 This efﬁcient knowledge transfer is
f course ideally suited to promoting the knowledge recombina-
ion vital to forming theories necessary to guide solution search for
omplex problems.
Authority-based hierarchy more centrally directs search and
hereby economizes on the costly transmission of knowledge that
haracterizes consensus-based hierarchy. Thus, hierarchy through
ts access to authority, low-powered incentives, and property rights
an both selectively facilitate and selectively avoid the transmission
f knowledge. As Arrow (1974) argues “the centralization of deci-
ion making, serves to economize on the transmission and handling
f knowledge” (1974: 69). It frees the manager from needing to
onvince individual actors of the economic value of taking par-
icular actions, sharing knowledge or solving particular problems.
n this manner, “[d]irection substitutes for education (that is for
he transfer of knowledge itself)” (Demsetz, 1988). In authority-
ased hierarchy, the central actor identiﬁes knowledge relevant to
roblem solving and then orders a pattern of trials and assigns sub-
roblems to individuals and teams. Authority permits the manager
o efﬁciently structure the ﬂow of knowledge, facilitating it where
eeded, and otherwise avoiding unnecessary or costly knowledge
xchange.
Both forms of hierarchy are thus well suited to solving more
omplex problems, where the location of relevant knowledge is
nown to the focal ﬁrm (see Fig. 1). To govern through hierarchy
resumes that the manager can centrally identify, hire or acquire
nowledge relevant to problem solving. Low-powered incentives
nd ﬁrm-owned property rights over the solutions generated
12 Echoing Arrow’s earlier arguments (1974: 56), Kogut and Zander (1996) suggest
hat ﬁrms develop distinct identities that reduce the costs of communicating and
stablish “rules of coordination and [inﬂuence] the direction of search and learning”
1996: 503).olicy 43 (2014) 914–925 919
encourage the requisite knowledge sharing for forming theories
to guide search. Consensus-based hierarchies, with their focus on
rich horizontal communication channels that support knowledge
exchange among peers, are ideally suited to solving the most com-
plex, non-decomposable problems, where widespread knowledge
sharing is critical to the formation of theory essential to exploration.
By contrast, authority-based hierarchy provides an efﬁcient vehi-
cle for solving moderately complex problems by economizing on
unnecessary or costly knowledge transfer, while still permitting
guided search. Authority can be used to structure moderately com-
plex problems into sub-problems that individuals or subgroups can
solve relatively autonomously, with only limited central coordina-
tion. Consistent with this general logic on hierarchy’s advantage,
empirical studies suggest that hierarchy is both more frequently
selected and higher performing when ﬁrms confront complex or
ill structured problems (Macher and Boerner, 2012; Kapoor and
Adner, 2012).
Hierarchy’s drawback is the tremendous burden it places on the
manager to centrally identify relevant knowledge. For many prob-
lems, such central identiﬁcation is infeasible. At the same time, for
many problems the knowledge sharing facilitated by low-powered
incentives, centrally controlled property rights, and rich commu-
nication channels are of no value and damage motivation. Thus,
while hierarchical forms are well suited to supporting theory-
guided search, hierarchy has clear limits. Managerial authority can
serve as an impediment to efﬁcient decentralized search, as man-
agers have a propensity to meddle (cf. Foss, 2003), and authority
of course does not equate with expertise in directing search. In all,
when critical knowledge lies outside the ﬁrm in unknown loca-
tions, centrally directed search is problematic. Table 2 summarizes
the governance instruments associated with each of these forms,
while Fig. 1 locates these forms in terms of the capacities for search
guidance and knowledge identiﬁcation.
3.2. Forms of open innovation
While low-powered incentives, ﬁrm-owned property rights,
and rich communication channels deﬁne hierarchical forms, well
suited for solving complex and moderately complex problems
using knowledge identiﬁable by managers, open forms of innova-
tion offer modiﬁed governance attributes that permit access to a
broader array of knowledge, and often more powerful motivation
for decentralized search well suited to alternative types of prob-
lems. Indeed, open innovation is often deﬁned as and equated with
the use of external markets. For example, West (2007) (openinno-
vation.net, 8/28/2007) argues that “open innovation is using the
market rather than internal hierarchies to source and commer-
cialize innovations” (also see Raymond, 2001). We discuss four
categories of more open governance forms: markets/contracts,
partnerships/alliances/CVC, contests/platforms/tournaments, and
user/community innovation. Each of these categories represents
a novel conﬁguration of communication channels, incentives, and
property rights—and we  thus lump forms together where gover-
nance attributes are shared. Each of these categories of governance
form is reasonably consistent within forms, but is distinct from the
other categories (see Table 2). Our goal is by no means to be exhaus-
tive in our discussion of these forms, and future work certainly
might also make more ﬁne-grained, within-category distinctions.
We simply use these categories as illustrations of how distinct
governance forms are deﬁned by distinct approaches to communi-
cation channels, incentives and property rights that enable distinct
forms of solution search and problem solving.3.2.1. Markets and contracts
By market or the contractual governance of innovation, we mean
a focal ﬁrm that identiﬁes a problem and then either selectively
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the highly uncertain nature of problem solving, the difﬁculty of
assessing effort and the quality of solutions, and the ex post hold-
up problems that surround highly specialized problem solving,20 T. Felin, T.R. Zenger / Rese
dentiﬁes or broadly invites those thought to possess potential solu-
ions or relevant knowledge to submit these for sale. Unlike more
ocially complex governance arrangements such as partnerships,
lliances, joint ventures, or CVC that can support greater ongo-
ng collaborative knowledge sharing and problem solving, through
arkets and contracts the focal ﬁrm seeks to match problems with
hose external parties that possess solutions or solution elements
often already solved, in the form of extant products or services)
t mutually agreeable prices. These market exchanges may  also
nvolve contracting for the generation of a tightly speciﬁed problem
olution, with payment contingent on delivery of that completed
olution. The capacity to identify or invite external actors with rel-
vant solutions or knowledge depends on the network, reach, and
nowledge of the focal ﬁrm.
Through market and contractual governance, focal ﬁrms seek
ccess to externally owned technology, knowledge, or solutions
argely through the exchange of property rights. These rights are
xternally retained and recognized, until contractually exchanged
t an agreed upon price. This transfer of property rights may  take
he form of a licensing arrangement in which rights to use the
olution are transferred for narrowly speciﬁed applications. For
any ﬁrms, licensing external technologies represents a critically
mportant source and input of innovation (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003).
lternatively, property rights to technology may  be completely sold
nd reassigned (e.g., in the case of the sale of a patent).
Reﬂecting in large part this clear assignment of property rights,
arkets provide high-powered incentives to those with relevant
nowledge to develop and sell their solutions (Williamson, 1991).
lear property rights motivate outside actors to develop knowl-
dge, meet customer speciﬁcations, and generate solutions for sale.
arkets invite identiﬁable external parties to self-select and pro-
ose solutions to innovation problems (Felin and Zenger, 2011;
ayek, 1945). The capacity of these external parties to effectively
ppropriate value from their solution proposals supports high-
owered incentives.
Markets or contracts provide limited support for communica-
ion and knowledge exchange. As noted above, knowledge transfer
enerally takes the form of completed solutions (such as, for
xample, patents purchased). Markets are rather poor at suppor-
ing open, collaborative knowledge exchange. Indeed, markets are
lagued by the Arrow information paradox—reﬂected in the simple
bservation that the value of knowledge is unknown until after it is
onveyed or explained, but once conveyed there is little need to pay
or it. Resolving this dilemma through contractual protection is dif-
cult, discouraging the form of open knowledge transfer critical for
heory guided search. While markets may  invite those with relevant
nowledge to self-reveal, the focal ﬁrm often has limited means to
idely broadcast problems to those who might possess relevant
nowledge. Instead, the focal ﬁrm is generally restricted to a pro-
ess of formal invitations or requests for proposal (RFP), distributed
o a selective set of ﬁrms deemed to already possess the requisite
nowledge or capability. Thus, while markets may  provide greater
ccess to broad sources of external knowledge than hierarchy or
ven alliances, they are more restricted in their access to exter-
al knowledge, compared to the more open forms of innovation
overnance discussed below.
Market or contractual governance, composed of the above bun-
le of instruments, is ideally suited to solving rather simple, well
tructured, and decomposable problems—problems that do not
emand extensive knowledge sharing with the focal ﬁrm, but ben-
ﬁt greatly from high-powered incentives that motivate external
ctors’ search. However, market governance is only well suited
o solving these decomposable problems when the focal ﬁrms
an identify those with the relevant knowledge and resources to
olve their problems. By contrast, complex problems that demand
xtensive knowledge sharing consistent with theory guided searcholicy 43 (2014) 914–925
beneﬁt from the more robust communication channels that alter-
native governance forms provide.
3.2.2. Partnerships, alliances, and CVC
Partnerships, alliances, and corporate venture capital (CVC)
comprise a category of governance forms that support solving prob-
lems of intermediate complexity (see Table 2 and Fig. 1). While
these individual governance forms are somewhat distinct, they
share much in common with regard to their support for governing
solution search and their approach to property rights, incentives,
and communication channels. In contrast to authority-based hier-
archy, which focuses on providing central direction, partnerships,
alliances, and CVC are a more open, collaborative category of gov-
ernance forms that invites identiﬁable external partners to more
openly exchange knowledge with the focal ﬁrm. This more open
exchange of knowledge invites the focal ﬁrm and its partners to
jointly compose theories to guide solution search for complex
problems. Thus, relative to markets, we can think of partnerships
and alliances as a set of governance forms that generate richer,
more multi-faceted relationships that support active problem solv-
ing and provide access to external knowledge (Dyer and Singh,
1998; Kogut, 2000) from a wide range of external constituents,
such as suppliers, competitors, and universities (e.g., Bercovitz and
Feldman, 2007; Hagedoorn et al., 2011; Laursen and Salter, 2006).13
Moreover, this category of forms not only supports knowledge
transfer, but richer forms of communication that enable the recom-
bination of knowledge and theory formation. Like authority-based
hierarchy, however, the use of alliances and partnerships to man-
age complex, nearly decomposable problems, requires the central
or focal ﬁrm to carefully manage the overall problem architecture
and interfaces among sub-problems and their solutions.
Similar to authority-based hierarchy, partnerships, alliances,
and CVC rely on either the focal ﬁrm or an external partner to
recognize external knowledge that is valuable and relevant to an
identiﬁed problem. Unlike markets and contracts or open contests,
as discussed below, partnerships and alliances often include rich
communication channels between the focal ﬁrm and partner to
support knowledge exchange. Moreover, to support such coop-
erative exchange, contracts and property rights are more open
ended, often focusing on efforts rather than unspeciﬁable outcomes
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Reuer and Arino, 2007).
To whatever degree is feasible or useful, property rights over
solutions or new knowledge generated are negotiated a priori
(Lerner and Merges, 1998). While a common structure is for one
party to negotiate for rights to the solutions generated by the
other, the party providing solutions seeks to narrowly limit the
control rights of the procuring ﬁrm, while the procuring ﬁrm seeks
the broadest possible range of control rights, including rights over
knowledge unrelated to the problem proposed (Lerner and Merges,
1998; Robinson and Stuart, 2007). Again, the approach to property
rights here is more open ended and perhaps dynamically negoti-
ated than the negotiation of property rights in market exchanges.
Necessarily, therefore, incentives are structured to invite collabora-
tion, joint production, and knowledge exchange rather than solely
self focused effort. Consequently, incentives are more lowered-
powered than those operating in market exchanges. In all, given13 Forms such as CVCs also have a close relationship with partnerships and
alliances. For example, Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005) discuss how CVC can play a
role in providing information for subsequent alliances with speciﬁc partners. Oth-
ers have used real options logic to link CVC with technology alliances (Van de Vrande
and  Vanhaverbeke, 2012).
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he contracts that support alliances may  focus on efforts or time
nd materials rather than outputs. Such contracts yield inherently
ower-powered incentives. While they encourage cooperation with
lliance partners, they may  discourage the exceptionally high lev-
ls of effort that can accompany the higher-powered incentives of
ore market-like governance.
In summary, the governance features of alliances, partnerships
nd CVCs are therefore well suited to moderately complex, nearly
ecomposable problems that also beneﬁt from knowledge that may
r may  not be partially hidden from the focal ﬁrm (Fig. 1). Solv-
ng these problems beneﬁts from signiﬁcant knowledge exchange,
ut at the same time beneﬁts from the somewhat higher-powered
ncentives and autonomy that alliances provide over full integra-
ion. Partnerships, alliances, and CVC also invite a limited process
f self-revelation, vital to uncovering relevant hidden knowledge,
hough this self-revelation process is nowhere near the levels that
ser communities and contests can offer, as discussed below.14
.2.3. Contests, tournaments, and innovation platforms
Contests, tournaments and innovation platforms are a category
f governance forms that seek to efﬁciently match ﬁrms possess-
ng problems to solve with a wider set of ﬁrms or individuals that
ay  possess relevant knowledge, including complete solutions.15
his category of forms also offers distinctive features with regard
o communication channels, incentives, and property rights (see
able 1). Contests are frequently supported by third party plat-
orms that provide extensive systems to support communication
nd coordination, particularly the capacity to broadcast problems
o a large constituency, which then provides potential solutions for
onsideration (Boudreau et al., 2011; Boudreau and Lakhani, 2013;
eppesen and Lakhani, 2010). By soliciting broad participation in
roblem solving, the focal ﬁrm hopes to discover those unknown
o them, who have the knowledge or capability, and for whom
enerating solutions is of exceptionally low cost.
Communication channels provided by these contest or tourna-
ent platforms are generally broad, but not deep. These contest
latforms leverage information technology to solicit and engage
roblem solvers and provide assistance to focal ﬁrms in deﬁning
nd formulating problems. While such contests and tournaments
ave become increasingly prevalent, there is also a rich history of
hese types of contests dating back at least to the 19th century
Brunt et al., 2011). Contests and platforms broadcast problems
o a large set of actors, who can then decide whether they have
he relevant knowledge that facilitates their efﬁciently providing a
olution. Thus, the burden of identifying relevant knowledge is not
ith the focal ﬁrm or manager, but rather with the problem solvers
ho hear of the problem. Individuals themselves judge whether
heir knowledge and expertise lends itself to best solving the inno-
ation problem at hand—they thus self-identify. Those possessing
nformation and knowledge that the focal ﬁrm may  view a priori as
uite unrelated to the problem, may  in fact provide distant knowl-
dge that ultimately proves critical to generating breakthrough
olutions (Bingham and Spradlin, 2011).
Incentives of various forms are central to contests and tourna-
ents (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Taylor, 1995), with prizes for
he most valuable solution being a common feature. Motivation
o participate therefore involves two elements: (1) the expected
14 We categorize alliances and CVCs in the same governance form, due to simi-
arities on our dimensions of interests. Scholars have indeed pointed out how CVCs
nd alliances reinforce each other, though there are also important differences (e.g.,
ushnitsky and Lavie, 2010).
15 The companies engaged in setting up and running various platforms and
ontests can be seen as engaging in many of the same functions as “innovation inter-
ediaries” (cf. Howells, 2006). The links between these forms, contests/platforms
nd intermediaries, provides an opportunity for future work.olicy 43 (2014) 914–925 921
probability of winning the prize, net of costs of effort, and (2) the
intrinsic rewards of participation. Often these intrinsic beneﬁts are
central to motivation, since for many participants, even their own
upwardly biased calculation of the probability of winning, times the
magnitude of the prize, fails to provide adequate compensation for
their time spent and costs incurred. As Malone et al. (2011) note, in
some cases the actual R&D costs of generating solutions far exceed
the prize money. Intrinsic motivation to participate is likely to vary
by problem and problem solver. More importantly, the actual costs
and probabilities of generating effective solutions will vary signiﬁ-
cantly. Thus, efﬁciently matching problems to problem solvers is a
key element of contests, tournaments, and the platforms that sup-
port them. Successful participation in contests and tournaments of
course may also have important reputational beneﬁts that offset the
need for signiﬁcant pecuniary rewards (cf. Lerner and Tirole, 2002).
Contest solvers may  appropriate value by signaling their abilities
and increasing their reputation, thereby positioning them to cap-
ture value, for example, by obtaining better jobs or starting new
companies.
The property rights associated with innovation contests and
tournaments are speciﬁed upfront. The property rights to the win-
ning solution are commonly ceded to the focal ﬁrm and the prize
(and associated reputational gains) is awarded in exchange. Firms
essentially buy the rights to the best solution—while the prize and
intrinsic rewards from participation compensate solvers for their
efforts and intellectual property. From a societal perspective, prizes
may  have some advantages over patent systems (Stiglitz, 2008: cf.
Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). Here the innovation may  be more
quickly discovered, deployed, and then diffused. But, ﬁrms of course
have various options in how they structure the property rights
associated with winning solutions.
Contests and tournaments are ideally suited to solving decom-
posable problems—clearly deﬁned, well-structured and simple (i.e.
non complex) problems or sub-problems (see Fig. 1). Furthermore,
contests and tournaments are optimal for solving innovation prob-
lems that allow for post hoc evaluation and comparison of solutions
in a relatively straightforward manner. The problem types that
are optimal for contests are simple or decomposable problems
where solution generation requires little interaction or coordina-
tion with other problem solving efforts within (or without) the ﬁrm.
Most importantly, contests and tournaments are ideally suited to
problems where the optimal sources of relevant knowledge are
unknown to the focal ﬁrm, and therefore broadcasting the problem
to a wide constituency in hopes of rather randomly discovering an
efﬁcient solution is desirable. But, contests and tournaments are
poorly suited to governing complex, non-decomposable problems
where solution discovery demands collective theory formation
through extensive knowledge sharing.16
3.2.4. Users and user communities
Accessing users and user communities represents another
path to governing innovation that is quite distinct from markets,
partnerships, and contests or tournaments. While an extensive lit-
erature has examined user and community innovation (e.g., Cohen
et al., 2002; Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 2006; Shah and Tripsas,
2007; von Hippel, 1986; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003), these dis-
cussions have not explicitly been comparative in the sense of look-
ing at the speciﬁc beneﬁts and costs of this governance form relative
to markets, partnership, tournaments and contests and hierar-
chies or internal innovation (though scholars have looked at user
innovation compared to “producer” innovation—see Baldwin and
von Hippel, 2012). Moreover, user innovation is viewed as largely
16 Contests may  also be effectively used to solicit input regarding how to effectively
decompose complex problems.
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utside the purview of producers, i.e. users select their own prob-
ems to explore, not a focal ﬁrm or producer. Nonetheless, some
ork has recently looked at how ﬁrms ﬁnd ways to actively engage
ith users and user communities (see Chatterji and Fabrizio, 2012,
013), for example by setting up platforms for interacting with
xternal constituents. One manifestation of this is ﬁrm-hosted user
nd innovation communities (Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 2006).
irms themselves have developed innovation communities for the
peciﬁc purpose of accessing the dispersed knowledge and exper-
ise that lies with users, particularly “lead” users. Contributing users
n these communities are often highly knowledgeable, leading-
dge experts who  can provide valuable knowledge and feedback
o the focal company regarding innovation and product improve-
ent. In these settings, there are generally no assigned property
ights nor incentives: “sharing and free revealing of innovation
re commonplace” (Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 2006: 57). Users
eveal information and knowledge in hopes that this information
nd knowledge will be incorporated by the focal organization and
mplemented in future innovations, which in turn beneﬁts lead
sers themselves, who seek high-quality products.
Like the forms for governing innovation previously discussed,
ser and community innovation also possesses a rather unique
ix  of governance features. Property rights over the solutions
enerated are typically not retained by the inventor, but ceded
oluntarily to the community or in some cases even captured
y the producer or ﬁrm whose product is being modiﬁed. But,
ore realistically, property rights are simply ignored as irrelevant
ithin user communities, as the motivations for contributing are
ither intrinsic (cf. Benkler, 2004), or linked solely to the personal
ains from using the innovation generated. Thus, the incentives to
olve problems are rather lower-powered, relative to markets or
ven contests.
When users or the user community generate solutions deemed
o be of value to a focal ﬁrm, these innovations can simply be
dopted and the beneﬁts are then shared by the community as a
hole, for example in the form of better products or added features.
or example, participants in the free software movement actively
ngage in creating various software solutions (e.g., the aforemen-
ioned Linux operating system) and open source software indeed
ow is a platform used by ﬁrms in the generation of value (see
itzgerald, 2006). Companies such as Red Hat then explicitly build
n and extend open source platforms in the development of inno-
ations. Furthermore, platform initiatives such as Android serve a
imilar function. Android was originally a closed mobile operat-
ng system developed by a private company, but then transformed
nto an open source platform and operating system. Android itself,
n turn, is built on the open source Linux platform. Firms thus inter-
ct with innovation communities in highly complex ways as they
eek to generate value and look for optimal ways to organize their
roblem solving and innovation.
Relative to both contests and markets, communication channels
n user communities are relatively rich and robust. Participants in
hese user communities have self-selected in, have often ceded con-
rol of property rights, and confront very low-powered incentives.
ommunities are indeed based on a culture in which the recogni-
ion of property rights and incentives is viewed as antithetical to
he overall ethos and motivation of contributors (Benkler, 2004).
ommunities instead rely on a diverse array of non-pecuniary
ncentives. Intrinsic motivation, passions, hobbies, or simply the
esire to cooperate for the public good may  drive participation
Franke and Shah, 2003; Shah and Tripsas, 2007). Communities,
hen, feature an abundance of voluntary knowledge sharing unim-
eded by concerns of ownership, which in turn supports the
nowledge recombination and theory formation vital to solving
omplex problems. At the same time these user communities
rovide a diverse array of highly relevant knowledge to which focalolicy 43 (2014) 914–925
ﬁrms can broadcast their problems. Thus, user communities may  at
once provide access to diverse, and otherwise hidden knowledge,
while at the same time providing in some circumstances support
for rich forms of knowledge exchange.
The combination of low-powered incentives, unrecognized
property rights, and rich communication channels of user com-
munities are actually most similar to the governance attributes
that prevail within consensus-based hierarchies. Both consensus-
based hierarchies and communities support extensive knowledge
sharing and cooperative problem solving. The clear advantage of
communities over consensus-based hierarchies, however, is the
capacity to access an abundance of otherwise hidden informa-
tion. The governance attributes of the user community render it
somewhat more versatile in terms of the scope of problems it can
efﬁciently solve. As noted, the combination of diverse knowledge
and incentives and an approach to property rights that encourages
knowledge sharing allows this form of governance to support
problem solving for relatively complex problems, with signiﬁcant
levels of hidden knowledge (see Fig. 1). At the same time, as
noted in Fig. 1, community and user innovation can certainly solve
simple, decomposable problems, particularly if these problems are
identiﬁed by users who independently possess sufﬁciently strong
incentives or interest to solve them. A primary challenge with
adopting user and community innovation as a form of innovation
governance is that a focal ﬁrm or focal actor may  have rather
limited control over or capacity to select, propose and effectively
broadcast speciﬁc problems to these communities. Instead, the
community is more likely to take up problems of interest to them.
Thus, the choice to rely on community innovation as a form of
innovation governance renders the focal ﬁrm a more passive actor
in managing the ﬁrm’s path of innovation.
4. Dynamics and countervailing forces of (open) innovation
In comparative institutional analysis, as presented here, differ-
ent institutional forms essentially “compete” in providing efﬁcient
governance to solving various problems. As the efﬁciency of one
form improves through innovation, or as the distribution of prob-
lems shifts, so will the distribution of observed governance. There
has in fact been a noted shift toward more open governance
forms in recent decades. Indeed, the governance of innovation
has rather consistently evolved since the Industrial Revolution
(Langlois, 2006; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998; Nigrinis, 2009) and
even ﬁrm-centric R&D is a relatively new innovation that did not
meaningfully exist prior to the 20th century. We should anticipate
continued innovation in the governance of innovation itself. While
we might ask about the determinants of a variety of historical shifts
in governance, consistent with the topic at hand, we speciﬁcally
focus here on those factors that have prompted the shift toward
more open forms of innovation governance.
First, ﬁrms have developed or deployed technologies and plat-
forms that lower the communication costs of connecting with
external actors possessing disparate knowledge through various
forms of open innovation (cf. Garicano and Kaplan, 2001; Baldwin
and von Hippel, 2012; Chesbrough, 2007): partnerships, markets,
contests and tournaments and user or community. The increased
communication efﬁciency of more open forms of governance
enables these open forms to more closely replicate some of the
horizontal and vertical communication capacities of hierarchy, and
shift optimal governance choices at the margin. As communication
costs have diminished—for example, via improved technologies
and the development of common standards—ﬁrms are able to more
efﬁciently communicate both broadly to a wide range of actors
with knowledge, and deeply or richly with those selected through
open governance including markets (Langlois, 2003; cf. Baldwin,
2008) and peer communities (Benkler, 2002). Thus, the Internet,
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nnovation and web platforms for reverse procurement auctions
ave lowered the communication costs so that ﬁrms can now ﬁnd
nd broadcast their problems to a very wide set of constituents,
ho then self-select to participate based on the relevance of their
nowledge—themselves deciding whether they can efﬁciently offer
 solution. Innovation prizes similarly offer an efﬁcient mechanism
or soliciting potential solutions to innovation problems from a
ider set of constituents (e.g., Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010). These
echnologies allow ﬁrms to beneﬁt from the matching function of
arkets, the efﬁciency with which problems are matched with a
ide array of potential solvers (see Felin and Zenger, 2011). Thus,
echnologies have lowered the cost not just for ﬁrms posing prob-
ems, but also for the external audiences that provide potential
olutions. Solvers of problems in fact may  have readily available
nformation and knowledge to solve problems, and thus their costs
o contribute are also lower.
Second, ﬁrms have increasingly invested in innovatively trans-
orming previously complex, non-decomposable problems into
impler, more decomposable problems often guided by the com-
osition of theory. Firms make upfront investments in high-level
esign, commit to high-level architecture that reﬂects this the-
ry, and then outsource sub-problems. Such modularization allows
rms to decompose innovation into smaller sub-problems around
hich the ﬁrm can engage the productive (and sometimes volun-
ary) efforts of external constituents. A key driver in this design
nnovation is the declining costs of communication and com-
utation (Baldwin and von Hippel, 2012). Though not without
ubstantial challenges, Boeing shifted toward signiﬁcantly out-
ourcing innovation in its development of the 787 Dreamliner
Kotha, 2012). The enabling step was modularizing design and
stablishing distinct interfaces (also see Argyres and Bigelow, 2010
or an example from the early US auto industry). In a similar vein,
rms committed to greater openness in their innovation have redi-
ected their internal R&D efforts away from problem solving and
oward problem formulation (Baer et al., 2012). Thus, a key step
n enabling greater open innovation is providing clear deﬁnitions
f decomposed problems, which innovators can then take up with
onsiderable autonomy in solution search. The importance of such
odularity and well-deﬁned interfaces on sourcing decisions is of
ourse central to the arguments in the “modular theory of the ﬁrm”
Langlois, 2006; cf. Baldwin and Clark, 2003).
Third, the growth of open innovation, speciﬁcally contests
nd community and user innovation, has beneﬁtted from simple
etwork externalities that promote and enable the innovation plat-
orms that support these forms of open innovation. The key element
o increasing the probability of problem solving is to widely broad-
ast the problem in hopes of discovering those who  possess highly
elevant knowledge and who therefore have exceptionally low cost
n efﬁciently solving your problems. Innovation platforms, contests
nd intermediaries provide visible, centralized focal actors that can
ttract large numbers of prospective problem solvers. The critical
esource therefore is discovering or developing an optimal platform
or broadcasting problems to those likely to possess the most rel-
vant knowledge. The effectiveness of these platforms is governed
y simple network externalities in that the beneﬁts of participation
or those proposing problems expand as the number of relevant
roblem solvers increases. Similarly, the beneﬁts of participating
n problem solving increase as the number of relevant problems
and associated rewards) increases. Thus, as ﬁrms have drawn
ver-greater trafﬁc to their proprietary platforms (cf. Jeppesen and
rederiksen, 2006) or as these ﬁrms participate on third party plat-
orms (Bingham and Spradlin, 2011), the efﬁciency and value of
hese platforms as vehicles for open innovation expands. Nonethe-
ess, regardless of how efﬁcient such problem broadcasting has (or
ill) become, as noted above, there are categories of problems for
hich such governance is poorly suited.olicy 43 (2014) 914–925 923
Fourth, platforms that support contests or user and commu-
nity innovation have not only better matched problems to those
individuals or entities with uniquely applicable knowledge, they
have also reached out and innovatively tapped into the diverse
preferences and motivations that individuals possess for solving
particular types of problems. Thus, as we have noted, user and
community innovation typically operates on the basis of voluntary
contribution, often outside the bounds of traditional extrinsic or
pecuniary rewards. The personalized and intrinsic incentives that
underlie such volunteerism of course vary by individual, reﬂect-
ing for instance private beneﬁts that may  accompany helping an
organization (or cause). Individuals can also beneﬁt from problem
solving participation in other ways. Their high quality contributions
may  signal their ability to others (cf. Lerner and Tirole, 2002), or
individuals may  contribute to causes that they consider intrinsi-
cally worthwhile (for example, as shown by recent efforts toward
“citizen science” or “game-ifying” science—Good and Su, 2011).
In other words, user and community innovation can also be seen
as another vehicle for volunteering, where actors self-select and
choose to contribute time and effort to causes that privately ben-
eﬁt them or they care about. Thus, the growth of these more open
forms of innovation is partly a reﬂection of the increased efﬁciency
with which these platforms access this diversity of preferences and
incentives to contribute and volunteer.
In all, improvements in both governance instruments and
technologies are providing increased opportunities to more efﬁ-
ciently govern innovation. While traditional market-hierarchy
distinctions, as well as transaction costs, remain relevant for under-
standing the structure of production (Williamson, 1991), in this
paper we have moved beyond traditional market-hierarchy dis-
tinctions to look at this broader array of governance forms used
in organizing innovation. Reﬂecting the process of matching and
dynamics discussed above, ﬁrms are increasingly a complex amal-
gamation of both “closed” and “open” governance forms. Moreover,
as the selection of problems pursued by a ﬁrm shifts, these shifts
may  also result in dynamic shifts in governance.
5. Managerial implications and future directions
We believe our theoretical arguments have signiﬁcant manage-
rial implications and also point to important avenues for future
research. First, our focus has been on developing a theory of the
comparative governance of innovation, focused on how managers
can optimal match identiﬁable innovation problems with gover-
nance forms and the forms of search they support. Thus, in a
very direct manner our theory provides guidance to managers
(see Fig. 1). However, what we  have not discussed is the fact
that managers and ﬁrms are likely to differ in their ability or
capability to effectuate these alignments. Thus a central opportu-
nity for future research lies in studying the antecedents of such
managerial or ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity and its implications for
governance choices. A natural, future direction, for example, is to
study how some forms of governance may be more accessible or
familiar to certain organizations and thus lead to differing gov-
ernance choices. In other words, some ﬁrms may become more
adept at formulating or decomposing problems (cf. Baer et al.,
2012), or perhaps more capable or experienced at crafting differing
forms of governance (cf. Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Furthermore,
certain ﬁrms may  also possess ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics—such
as absorptive capacity (Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt, 2014)—which
allow them to beneﬁt from more open governance forms. Other
ﬁrms may  discover innovative ways to interact with users or
user communities that shape governance choices (Chatterji and
Fabrizio, 2013; Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 2006). A readily appar-
ent opportunity for future work, then, is to study these types of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc and managerial factors that shape the governance of
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nnovation. This nexus of ﬁrm-, transaction cost- and problem-
peciﬁc factors indeed provides an important area for future
esearch in governing innovation (cf. Argyres et al., 2012).
Second, while we have focused on six, relatively broad cate-
ories of governance forms in the tradition of Weberian ideal types,
rms constantly seek to innovatively assemble alternative con-
gurations of communication channels, incentives, and property
ights to more efﬁciently govern the process of innovation. Firms,
or example, may  develop unique incentives that mimic  the high-
owered incentives of markets (Foss, 2003; Zenger and Hesterly,
997). Or, ﬁrms may  experiment with unique forms of property
ights, where individual contributors and inventors, both internal
nd external to the ﬁrm, participate and appropriate value (e.g.,
aldwin and Henkel, 2012). The ever expanding array of innova-
ive governance conﬁgurations and mechanisms provides fertile
round for future research.
A third opportunity lies in studying how managers link the
ore micro-analytic exercise of problem solving and governance
ith wider, ﬁrm-level considerations. In other words, while we
ave treated problems in a relatively straightforward way, in effect,
aking the problem for granted, there are of course difﬁculties asso-
iated with both problem formulation and with linking problems to
he wider set of activities with which the ﬁrm is engaged. Managers
n reality deal with bundles or portfolios of innovation problems,
nd the inter-relationships between disparate problems and their
rm-level aggregate structure and scope are likely to introduce
dditional complexities into the managerial calculus.17 Further-
ore, along with dealing with an amalgam of governance-related
hoices, ﬁrms are also embedded in a broader social and com-
etitive environment, which our more micro-analytic approach
oes not capture. Thus there is an opportunity to link these
ore micro aspects of problem solving, governance and innova-
ion with the more macro, aggregate, ﬁrm- and even system or
nvironment-level considerations that undoubtedly are central for
nderstanding ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, value creation and inno-
ation (cf. Jacobides et al., 2006).
. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to offer a comparative
nd ﬁne-grained look at governing innovation via various open
nd closed forms. We  have speciﬁcally focused on the role of the
anager in specifying and articulating innovation problems and
ligning governance mechanisms appropriately. Our theory is thus
rescriptive in that we argue that certain types of innovation prob-
ems are best addressed by certain types of governance forms,
hether open or closed. Thus the optimal governance of innovation
s contingent on the nature of the innovation problem to be solved.
e speciﬁcally articulate how disparate governance forms offer
ccess to (a) different types of communication channels, (b) differ-
nt types of incentives and (c) different types of property rights.
hese differing governance forms, some open and some closed, in
urn support the differing forms of solution search that varying
nnovation problems mandate.
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